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Viewing cable 10MANAGUA115, U) Ortega and the U.S.: New-Found True Love Or Another

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MANAGUA115 2010-02-25 15:03 2010-12-06 21:09 SECRET Embassy Managua
VZCZCXRO3354
RR RUEHAO RUEHRN
DE RUEHMU #0115/01 0561550
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 251550Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0724
INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0011
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0006
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0001
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0001
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0001
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME 0005
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0001
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAGUA 000115 

SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
DEPT FOR USOAS 
DEPT PASS TO USAID/LAC -- JANET BALLENTINE AND ERIC KITE 
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD AND J5 
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE 
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC 
AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/24 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID MARR XR RS IR XK
SUBJECT: (U) Ortega and the U.S.: New-Found True Love Or Another 
Still-Born Charm Offensive? 

REF: A) MANAGUA 182 -- REQUEST TO RENEW STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT 
B) MANAGUA 49 -- ORTEGA ATTACKS U.S. "OCCUPATION" OF HAITI 
C) 2009 MANAGUA 1090 -- FSLN PROTESTORS ATTACKS U.S. EMBASSY 
D) 2009 MANAGUA 913 -- NICARAGUA RECOGNIZES BREAK-AWAY GEORGIA 
REPUBLICS 
E) 2009 MANAGUA 912 -- ORTEGA ATTACKS U.S. IN ARMY ANNIVERSARY SPEECH 
F) 2009 MANAGUA 871 -- NON-COOPERATION IN ARMS CASE 
G) 2009 MANAGUA 599 -- MCC CANCELLED 

CLASSIFIED BY: Robert J. Callahan, Ambassador, Department of State, 
Exec; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 

Summary 



1. (S) Over the last six weeks, President Ortega has made an 
uncharacteristically intense effort to pass messages of 
conciliation and cooperation in our direction. Ortega's actions 
include renewed cooperation on some dormant legal assistance 
requests, especially cordial treatment of visiting VIPs, a possible 
decision on a new Ambassador-designate, and a personal and quick 
response to the Ambassador's request for information from Ortega 
regarding the Secretary's planned trip to the region. Yet, over 
the past three years, such "good" behavior by Ortega has occurred 
only when he sought a particular political objective - e.g. the 
early-2009 "charm offensive" that unsuccessfully sought to prevent 
the partial termination of Nicaragua's MCC compact. The motivation 
behind the current "charm offensive" is still unclear, but is 
unlikely to portend a new, friendly Ortega with whom we can work in 
the long-term. End Summary. 



GON Has Been Cooperative Lately 



2. (S) Over the last few weeks, we have noted a concerted effort 
by President Daniel Ortega and First Lady Rosario Murillo to send 
conciliatory signals our way. In late-January we were contacted by 
the Foreign Ministry seeking to re-engage us on a renewal of the 
Status of Forces Agreement governing U.S. troop presence in 
Nicaragua (REF A). At about the same time, the Foreign Minister and 
the Attorney General both indicated to the Ambassador that the 
government desired to be helpful on some long-stagnant evidence 
transfers requests we had made in 2009 (REF F). We also learned 
that Ortega recently approached Arturo Cruz, Jr, the former 
Ambassador to the U.S., about returning for a second tour as 
Managua's representative in Washington, a post that has been vacant 
since Cruz himself left it in March 2009 (details SEPTEL). Ortega, 
through Cruz, has also invited WHA DAS Julissa Reynoso to visit 
Managua. Additionally, both Ortega and Murillo were exceptionally, 
and uncharacteristically, friendly to the U.S. Delegation, led by 
DASD Dr. Frank Mora, that attended the February 22 change of 
command ceremony for Nicaragua's Military High Command. Both 
Ortega and Murillo spent several minutes with the USDEL prior to 
the ceremony and were effusive in their praise of U.S. mil-to-mil 
assistance. This string of events taken together, over the past 
six weeks, represents an unusually friendly level of communication 
and interaction by the Ortega government. 



3. (C) On Friday, February 19, per instructions from Washington, 
the Ambassador contacted the President's office to inquire whether 
Ortega would participate in a proposed meeting between the 
Secretary and Central American heads of state that would take place 
in Guatemala during the first week of March. Normally our requests 

MANAGUA 00000115 002 OF 004 


of this nature go unanswered. However, within a few hours of 
making this initial contact, First Lady Murillo personally called 
the Ambassador seeking more information about the meeting. She 
also asked the Ambassador to visit the Ortega residence, which also 
serves as the Presidential "offices." NOTE: In 2007, Ortega 
refused to occupy Nicaragua's Presidential palace. Instead he 
governs the country - and runs his Sandinista party -- from his 
home. END NOTE. Murillo asked the Ambassador to meet that same 
evening following a Cabinet meeting; however, she later called to 
re-schedule for the afternoon of Saturday, February 20, explaining 
the cabinet meeting had run longer than expected. 



Is this really "True Love?" 



4. (C) During the Saturday afternoon meeting, the Ambassador found 
the First Couple cordial, even friendly, contrary to past 
experience. Ortega apologized for the attack on the Embassy in 
November (REF C), noting that he had personally intervened with the 
Chief of Police to ensure the Embassy [eventually] had protection 
from anti-riot units (and for the Ambassador himself on the 
following day). When the Ambassador noted our concern over the 
fact that senior FSLN leaders had been seen urging on the violent 
protestors, Ortega somewhat sheepishly acknowledged that at times, 
even he, cannot control his own people. 



Ambassador to Ortega: Your Behavior Damages Our Relations 



5. (C) The Ambassador raised the nearly year-long vacancy at 
Nicaragua's Embassy in Washington, noting that some in Washington 
perceive this as an intentional slight by Managua. Ortega 
responded slyly that he was on the verge of naming - likely in 
March - a new man (or, he noted, even a woman) to fill the post. 
("Tal vez, una embajadora...") The Ambassador also protested 
Ortega's false claims about the U.S. "military occupation" of Haiti 
following the January 12 earthquake (REF B). He told Ortega the 
Secretary had been very angry at Ortega for the malicious comments. 
Ortega responded weakly that he had spoken in ignorance, and that 
he later became aware that other nations had also sent troops. 



6. (C) Turning to the Secretary's proposed Guatemala meeting with 
regional heads-of-state, Ortega expressed concern that U.S. intent 
was to force the issue of Honduras recognition. He restated 
Nicaragua's opposition to recognizing the Lobo government, adding 
that he would do nothing until the various censures on Honduras by 
multilateral bodies - the UN, OAS, SICA, Rio Group, and ALBA. - had 
been lifted. Ortega said he needed more information before 
agreeing, but ended the one-and-one-half-hour meeting on a friendly 
note. The First Couple's good will carried into Sunday, when they 
met with the U.S. delegation attending the change of command 
ceremony for Nicaragua's military high command. Ortega and Murillo 
were careful to spend several minutes chatting with each member of 
the USDel before the ceremony. Even Ortega's remarks, which 
included the typical anti-imperialist screed, were milder than 
normal. 

MANAGUA 00000115 003 OF 004 


What's "Wrong" With Ortega? 



7. (C) While Ortega's true motives are only ever fully known to 
himself, over the past three years we have occasionally seen his 
"conciliatory" face, but only as a means to a short-term objective. 
We recall the unsuccessful charm offensive against us in early-2009 
that sought to prevent the partial termination of MCC (REF G). It 
was followed by vicious and malicious public attacks over several 
months, culminating with Ortega's speech at the Army birthday 
celebration, when he accused U.S. forces of genocide (REF E) The 
pattern is a spurt of amity and cooperation that is immediately 
followed by distance, contempt, and even hostility regardless of 
whether his objective is achieved. At times it seems Ortega's 
subsequent "rejection" of his "intended" is more severe when he 
succeeds. Others - the Europeans, Taiwan, Japan, the World Bank 
and the IMF - have received similar treatment, often ahead of 
decisions on funding for foreign assistance or important visits. 
Nearly all have subsequently been spurned. 



Is It Frustrated Foreign Policy? 



8. (C) One of Ortega's current motives in seeking a "thaw" with us 
may be a reflection of his unsuccessful attempts to wean Nicaragua 
off the "imperialist" aid of the United States and Europe. He is 
keenly aware (and resentful) of Nicaragua's dependence upon outside 
assistance, especially ours. Given his constant anti-U.S. 
rhetoric, the scale and persistence of U.S. aid contrasts greatly 
with that of other patrons Ortega has actively wooed. Three years 
of persistent overtures to Iran have failed to produce anything 
besides ideological capital and a handful of commercial 
delegations. His long-standing ally, Cuba, continues to provide 
medical and educational "brigades" for rural Nicaragua, but these 
rely on Venezuelan funding and the support of their Nicaraguan 
hosts for sustenance. Russia has been Ortega's other promising 
target. His recognition of Georgia's two breakaway republics was 
clearly designed to please Moscow (REF D), and though Moscow has 
recently come through with some limited assistance, including a 
fleet of modern buses and the promise of military aid and 
cooperation, the commitment still falls far short of Cold War 
levels, for which Ortega had hoped. Russian Foreign Minister 
Lavrov was on the ground for less than 24 hours here during his 
mid-February trip. 



Is It Unrequited ALBA? 



9. (S) The ALBA bloc is an increasingly vocal and coordinated 
grouping that demands attention in international fora, both inside 
and outside the Hemisphere. Yet there are indications that the 
Ortega-Chavez revolutionary partnership may be suffering a cold 
snap. Over three years, Chavez has supplied Ortega with nearly a 
billion dollars in badly-needed "assistance," but Ortega's constant 
need for operating cash to off-set forfeited donor assistance is 
likely now wearisome for Chavez who faces growing domestic economic 

MANAGUA 00000115 004 OF 004 


difficulties. The Venezuelan in charge of the joint-venture ALBA 
de Nicaragua (ALBANISA), an umbrella holding company that channels 
Venezuelan funds, was recently "recalled" to Caracas after a series 
of unfortunate public statements about Venezuela's plan and goals 
in Nicaragua. The "dynamic duo" appears to have been strained by 
several factors, including disagreements over how aggressively to 
exploit Zelaya and the Honduras coup and rivalry over who is the 
Hemisphere's rightful heir to Castro's "revolutionary" legacy. 
Both Chavez and Raul Castro came here for the hastily-convened June 
2009 ALBA/SICA/Rio Group meeting that followed the Honduras coup. 
Yet both confirmed for, but failed to attend, Ortega's July 19 gala 
commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Sandinista victory. 
Ortega was also surely stung by the last-minute cancellations of 
both Venezuela and Cuba for the recent military change of command. 
Even so, we do not/not believe that ALBA is in imminent danger of 
collapse. In fact, we are confident that Ortega would not 
recognize Honduras without prior consultation with, even 
authorization by, Chavez. 



Comment 



10. (C) At this point, we can only speculate as to Ortega's 
underlying aim or motive behind this current amiable countenance. 
We note that in Nicaragua's most famous theatrical work, "El 
Gueguense" (The Old Man), performers hold masks over their faces. 
The theme is deception, and the ubiquitous masks, with their false, 
painted-on smiles, symbolize the mutual distrust between the 
colonial-era indigenous population and their duplicitous Spanish 
overlords. The smiling masks project an outward appearance of 
comity and respect, while true visages and feelings are hidden from 
view. In our experience, Ortega's charm offensives are gueguense - 
short-lived and insincere. Perhaps in the face of 
less-than-successful foreign policy to diversify his donor base, 
and disenchanted with the lack of revolutionary camaraderie within 
the Bolivarian experiment, he simply seeks reassurance that we plan 
to stay on here. We will. And hope this new beginning does not 
end in disappointment, again. 
CALLAHAN